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Public health researchers have traditionally relied on administrative databases, mandated outcome 
registries and population health surveys to 
inform their research. While each data source 
has its strengths, the individual patient record 
data held by primary healthcare providers 
is flexible to changing public health needs, 
burdens and issues. In Australia, most general 
practitioners (GPs) maintain these databases 
in their practices. GP databases from multiple 
practices can be aggregated to form what 
the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
(AIHW) has called a ‘GP data collection’.1 Such 
data collections are becoming increasingly 
common1 with the proliferation of practice-
level clinical and administrative e-databases, 
data extraction software, and data 
aggregation protocols. Not surprisingly, these 
data collections are being used to support 
clinical and business decision making2 
and are being used to inform population 
health studies.3-5 Location information can 
enhance both clinical and business decision 
making, and inform public health research.2,6 
Ambulatory primary care data collection 
systems in the United States include the New 
York Department of Health’s (NYDOH) ‘Hub’, 
which collects and analyses geographically 
attributed clinical data and is integral to 
NYDOH’s decision-making process.7 Similarly, 
a recently tested data protocol in Canada, 
implements spatial analyses such as spatial 
cluster analysis on data from 3,000 practices.8 
In the United Kingdom, with its near universal 
registration and extensive advanced 
computerisation of practices, data from GP 
practices have been used to map chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease at the national 
scale9 and type-2 diabetes at a local scale.5 
Geographic GP practice data:  
the problem
In Australia, data extracted from GP data 
collections for research and analysis purposes 
rarely incorporate spatial information, 
with the exception of postcodes. The main 
reason for this is to ensure patient privacy by 
providing information in such a way that the 
information is not identifiable. Identifiable 
information should not be made available 
to researchers without explicit patient 
consent and, in general, obtaining consent 
of all patients in a practice is not practical, 
although in most cases opportunities are 
provided for patients to opt out of such data 
extractions. Since addresses can individually 
identify patients, they must be removed or 
otherwise obscured (as must other identifiers) 
from any data where each record represents 
a patient or a patient encounter if they are to 
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Abstract
Background: General practitioner (GP) practices in Australia are increasingly storing patient 
information in electronic databases. These practice databases can be accessed by clinical 
audit software to generate reports that inform clinical or population health decision making 
and public health surveillance. Many audit software applications also have the capacity to 
generate de-identified patient unit record data. However, the de-identified nature of the 
extracted data means that these records often lack geographic information. Without spatial 
references, it is impossible to build maps reflecting the spatial distribution of patients with 
particular conditions and needs. Links to socioeconomic, demographic, environmental or 
other geographically based information are also not possible. In some cases, relatively coarse 
geographies such as postcode are available, but these are of limited use and researchers 
cannot undertake precision spatial analyses such as calculating travel times. 
Methods: We describe a method that allows researchers to implement meaningful mapping 
and spatial epidemiological analyses of practice level patient data while preserving privacy. 
Results: This solution has been piloted in a diabetes risk research project in the patient 
population of a practice in Adelaide.
Conclusions and implications: The method offers researchers a powerful means of analysing 
geographic clinic data in a privacy-protected manner.
Key words: privacy, Geographical Information Systems (GIS), geospatial, general practice (GP) 
data collection, Australia, de-identified data, confidentiality
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be transferred to external parties for purposes 
such as research and surveillance. There are 
many approaches to the protection of privacy 
of unit record data including the addition 
or subtraction of a small random number to 
the value being protected or suppression 
of data from areas with small counts.10 For 
example, a random number of years may be 
added to the age of people in unit record 
data to protect their privacy. However, a 
more common approach to protecting 
patient privacy while incorporating location 
attributes is areal aggregation. The principle 
of areal aggregation is simply that if there are 
sufficient numbers of records in a defined 
geographic area such that it is impossible 
to identify individuals, then individuals 
are protected. Census bureaus in most 
jurisdictions, including the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS), aggregate their geographic 
population data before release. For example, 
the smallest geography in Australian 
Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS)11 is 
a Mesh Block, an aggregation of 30 to 60 
dwellings. Areal aggregation also satisfies 
an important principle of privacy protection 
known as the k-anonymity principle,12,13 
where an individual’s record can be ‘confused’ 
with at least k other records. 
While ‘on-the-fly’ aggregation of clinical data 
and patient addresses to small geographies 
may achieve the optimal solution of providing 
data privacy while allowing meaningful 
analyses, such solutions are difficult to 
implement and not usually available. One 
solution is to extract patient postcodes 
from GP data collections, which effectively 
provides privacy protection through de 
facto aggregation, since postcodes in urban 
Australia have a more than enough people 
(median census population in postcodes 
is 3,500), contingent on the number of 
attributes associated with each person. 
In Australia, several utilities exist that 
can extract clinical data from practice 
management databases but most do not 
extract geography, and those that do 
usually extract postcodes.1 These tools 
include GRHANITE (GeneRic HeAlth Network 
Information Technology for the Enterprise),14 
Canning Division Tool and Pen CAT.15 The 
lack of geography in data extracted from 
GP practices may in part be because the 
clinicians, researchers or decision-makers 
using GP practice data have not needed 
the spatial dimension of the patient data. 
Thus for example, while the GRHANITE data 
extraction and aggregation tool has been 
used to create data collections with patient 
postcode,1 the Collaborative Network 
and Data Using IT (CONDUIT)1 program, a 
nationwide surveillance program utilising 
the tool,3 does not incorporate or collect any 
patient geography. However, other tools do 
extract postcodes that allow the production 
of spatially explicit reports2 at this relatively 
broad level.
Postcodes as a geography have a number 
of drawbacks.16 Their geographical 
representations within the ABS 
geographical framework – Postal Areas – 
are only approximations of the underlying 
postcodes;17 they change over time, cover 
immense areas in rural Australia and may be 
too large in some densely populated urban 
areas for observing small area geographical 
variations. Further, as they are defined for 
postal purposes, many do not accord with 
social or political boundaries, and some have 
areas that are not contiguous. However, with 
the current suite of available practice data 
extraction tools, a researcher often has no 
option but to use the postcode geography. 
Data custodians may consider requests 
from researchers for spatial health data at a 
finer precision than postcodes, since such 
parties may be considered as ‘trusted’ or 
‘semi-trusted’ as opposed to release of data 
to the general public.8,18 Indeed, there exists 
a privacy-access continuum with individually 
identifiable restricted data at one end and 
aggregated publicly accessible data at 
another. Researchers may need individual-
level data but, unlike GPs, may not require 
identifiable individual data. Many geospatial 
research problems can be successfully 
addressed with data at a reasonable degree 
of aggregation.19 However, currently in 
the Australian GP practice data context, 
there is no opportunity to release data at 
a geographic precision between patient 
address and postcode. That is to say that 
it is an all-or-nothing approach – release 
data (albeit to trusted users) that includes 
individually identifiable addresses, or limit 
the location accuracy to postcode. Having 
the flexibility to choose a geography that is 
appropriate for a given project is important. 
An appropriate level often lies between 
address and postcode, since this can both 
refine the analyses and retain confidentiality. 
Geographic GP data:  
a possible solution
One compromise approach requires that 
either the researcher or a computer program 
have access to the address data and the 
clinical data, but not both at the same time. 
Therein lies the solution. In fact, for some 
time researchers have realised that the key 
to de-identifying individual level or “unit 
record” data is the separation of identifying 
information such as names and birthdays 
from other clinical and demographic 
information.5,20 In the Australian context, 
there is a large body of literature on the 
process of de-identification and linkage 
of administrative data.21-27 In addition to 
separating the identifying information from 
the clinical data, these processes seek to link 
various datasets together while separating 
the linkage process from the datasets. The 
identifying information are removed, linked 
and encrypted. Unit records in the datasets 
are then assigned the encrypted keys that 
can be used to link them together on the fly, 
or they can be analysed independently if so 
desired without any breach of confidentiality. 
In addition to identifiable information being 
separated from clinical data, there is role 
separation between individuals who work 
with the clinical data and those who work 
with the identifiable information such as 
addresses. Such protocols have been used 
for some large surveys.23 Of the various 
administrative data linkage units in Australia, 
such as Data Linkage Western Australia, few 
incorporate geography beyond postcodes24 
and these usually do not link to GP practice 
data (other than through ad hoc requests for 
linkage), although given the richness of such 
datasets their inclusion could greatly enhance 
the research potential of the data. 
A similar approach has also been adopted 
in the GP practice spatial-data domain in a 
spatial analysis project in Tower Hamlets, 
London. In this project a pseudonymised 
identifier was created for each record in the 
databases5 of participating GP practices. The 
clinical data attached to the identifier and 
the postcodes attached to the identifier were 
extracted separately and reattached later for 
analysis. Note that six-digit postcodes in the 
UK are only slightly larger than ASGS Mesh 
Blocks. A similar exercise in Australia would 
have to be done at a geography with fine 
enough a resolution to achieve the required 
precision of analysis – a criteria that, as 
discussed above, Australian postcodes will 
often not satisfy. 
Since the location information is to be 
separated from the clinical information and 
assigned unidentifiable keys, finer precision 
location information held separately from 
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the clinical data does not additionally 
compromise the data over coarser precision 
data, as long as the geography is suitably 
coarse when reintegrated with the clinical 
data. For example, the use of addresses over 
postcodes does not in any way additionally 
compromise the data, as long as it is kept 
separately. In the section that follows, we 
describe a methodology we have developed 
and implemented that relies on the principle 
of separation and de-identification described 
above to analyse GP practice geospatial 
data in Australia and that allows external 
researchers to implement spatial analyses.
Method
The methods described here are those 
implemented by a team at the National 
Centre for Geographic and Resource Analysis 
in Primary Health Care (GRAPHC) in the 
Australian Primary Health Care Research 
Institute at the Australian National University. 
They are mostly described in a generalised 
form as the methods can be implemented 
in many ways but, where necessary, the 
terminology of the GRAPHC implementation 
is used for convenience.
In a typical scenario, a researcher wishes 
to analyse practice data from one or more 
general practices. The researcher registers 
with a secure dedicated server maintained 
by the GRAPHC team, after obtaining 
appropriate ethics clearances. The general 
practice data extraction process typically 
results in two datasets: de-identified clinical 
data; and the patient-identifying data that 
includes an address. Addresses from the 
patient data file are submitted to the secure 
dedicated server that returns a unique 
identifier for each address – GRAPHC uses 
a Globally Unique Identifier28 (GUID), which 
has a very low likelihood of non-uniqueness. 
The identifier has no qualities that can be 
used to determine or derive an address. The 
new identifiers are known as GTAGs and, for 
convenience, we refer to them in this way 
throughout this discussion. As each identifier 
is returned, it is assigned to the appropriate 
de-identified clinical data record. In this way, 
the de-identified data can be handed to 
researchers and analysts without any directly 
embedded location data, but with a link that 
permits spatial referencing or spatial analysis 
at a later time.
Researchers can request particular spatial 
attributes or linked data for each relevant 
GTAG, or spatial analyses for batches of 
GTAGs. Addresses need to be geocoded to 
latitude and longitude within the secure 
server to permit the necessary analyses. 
Addresses and co-ordinates are never made 
available to external users, as this would 
breach privacy. The linked information 
requested could be: 
•	 the region in which the address is 
located, generally in our context the ABS 
geographies such as the ASGS Statistical 
Area-1 (SA1) or the larger SA-2s or SA-3s; 
•	 analyses such as the distances of a batch 
of GTAGs from a specific location such as a 
hospital; 
•	 demographic, socioeconomic or other 
area-based population indicators available 
from GRAPHC (e.g. the GP-to-population-
ratio in an area). 
Results are sent back to the researcher, either 
attached to GTAGs so they can be linked 
directly to the clinical records or as a report 
(such as maps and graphs), or both. This 
method allows the researcher to implement 
analyses at a meaningful and relevant 
spatial precision without compromising the 
researchers’ ethical clearances or patient 
confidentiality. Figure 1 summarises the 
workflow described above.
In most situations, the researcher operates 
independently of the GRAPHC team, and thus 
does not have access to the clinical data and 
individual address information at one time. 
In rare circumstances, when the researcher 
is based within the GRAPHC team (as in the 
example described below), the researcher is 
not permitted to access the GRAPHC server 
that implements the above protocol.
Results
The method described above has been 
implemented in the context of one GP 
practice in Adelaide.29 The clinical information 
consisted of de-identified health records on 
31,940 unique patients for the period January 
2009 to June 2012. Patients who were not 
‘active’ were removed, using the Royal 
Australian College of General Practitioners’ 
definition that considers patients who have 
been seen once in the past 15 months to be 
active.30 This resulted in a dataset of 14,969 
(46.8%) active patients. GTAGs were attached 
to de-identified clinical data using the above 
protocol. The addresses were then geocoded 
on the secure server and geocodes attributed 
to SA1s.11 This geography offers a much 
better spatial resolution than postcodes 
and is designed to be longitudinally stable. 
There are 55,000 SA1s in Australia with a 
median resident population of around 400. 
Most patients attending the practice lived 
relatively nearby, meaning that large patient 
populations were present in these SA1s, 
however some of the more distant SA1s 
had relatively small patient populations 
and to ensure confidentiality all SA1s with 
five or fewer patients were deleted. Of the 
14,969 active patients, 97% were successfully 
geocoded to 282 unique SA1s. A researcher 
developed models of diabetes risk and 
calculated rates of diabetes within the SA1 
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Figure 1: Privacy protection workflow.
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areas with this data.29 A sample map from this 
research is displayed in Figure 2. It shows a 
smoothed map of diagnosed diabetes rates 
per 1,000 people within the clinical data set. 
Discussion
The problems faced by researchers wishing 
to apply spatial analyses to data collected 
from GP practices while maintaining patient 
privacy are significant. The approach 
outlined in this paper provides a means 
of allowing researchers to attach a spatial 
marker (like SA1 or SA2 identifiers), or 
implement additional analyses to the 
clinical demographic data extracted from 
a practice database, without the need to 
access any personal identifying information. 
The methodology allows additional analyses 
with finer levels of spatial data such as travel 
distances than could be implemented by 
researchers having access to only the areal 
spatial identifiers. To our knowledge, this is 
the first time in Australia that GP practice 
data has been used for geospatial analysis 
at a fine resolution in a privacy-protected 
manner using remote servers. Beyond this 
pilot project, the system and paradigm 
described here is being tested on a number of 
additional projects.
As with any system that manages sensitive 
information, it is important to assess 
possible scenarios through which data 
re-identification may be possible.8 Two such 
scenarios are relevant to this system:
Re-identification through researcher
This paradigm ensures that the address 
and the patient data never come together. 
Nevertheless, it is important to understand 
that the system cannot provide protection 
beyond what the researcher requests. It 
will, however, protect the researcher from 
inadvertent re-identification to a significant 
extent. If, for example, the researcher is 
permitted by the ethics committee to code 
addresses at the SA3 level (which are ASGS 
geographies with 30,000 to 130,000 people) 
and the researcher has registered this with 
the server administrators, then GRAPHC’s 
GTAG System ensures that attempts to geo-
attribute to smaller geographies will not be 
successful. 
The system cannot protect from re-
identification through the introduction of 
secondary data.13 It is possible that the use 
of small areas could introduce potential 
opportunities for re-identification of a person 
with otherwise unusual attributes (such 
as age, country of origin, unusual health 
conditions or more likely a combination of 
these). In these cases, the ethics approval 
could specify that the de-identified clinical 
data be stripped of such secondary indicators. 
Alternatively, they could be aggregated (for 
example, to broader age groups) before 
geographic identifiers are added to comply 
with reasonable expectations of small area 
sample anonymity. 
It is important to underscore the role of the 
researcher in protecting the privacy of health 
data. The onus is on the researcher to ensure 
the data are appropriately privacy protected 
at all stages. For example, the map in Figure 
2 illustrates how a researcher may protect 
the privacy of data when publishing at small 
geographies. A choropleth map of diagnosed 
diabetes rates at SA1s may not necessarily 
be privacy protected. Since SA1s are small 
geographies, it may be possible to derive the 
number of cases in a geography from a map 
of rates and if, for example, only one case is 
found, to identify the person with additional 
information on the person/locality (in the 
case of this map, of course, no SA1 has less 
than 5 cases). However, if a map is ‘smoothed’ 
as in Figure 2, in addition to the displayed 
rates being statistically more stable than if the 
rates were displayed at small geographies,31 
identification of individuals is impossible. 
Re-identification through unauthorised access
The separation of patient addresses from 
their context data is the key to the power 
of this paradigm. A data hack32 would have 
to access the secure server and also obtain 
clinical information from the practice or the 
researcher to be able to breach the privacy of 
the data. This scenario is extremely unlikely, 
given that researcher computers are separate 
from the secure server. It would be much 
easier to hack the practice database with 
patient clinical/address information.19
Thus, this paradigm offers the research 
community the ability to analyse GP practice 
or other confidential data in a spatially explicit 
manner, without undue challenges to privacy.
Conclusions
The separation of identifiable and non-
identifiable clinical information, the use 
of a secure system to provide geographic 
information and the ability to link geography 
back to the confidential data provides an 
efficient and secure means of enabling spatial 
analysis of clinical data. While researchers and 
ethics committees must always apply care to 
setting the limits of such analyses to protect 
privacy, this system opens a door to a range 
of research that was otherwise not possible. 
The methods applied here can equally be 
Figure 2: Rates of diagnosed diabetes in the Lefevre Peninsula, Adelaide: Rates were smoothed using an Inverse 
Distance Interpolation algorithm. Numerators are number of diagnosed diabetes cases in the clinic data while 
denominators are all patients in the clinic.
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applied to confidential data from sources 
other than clinical practices, and potentially 
have a very wide range of usage.
References
1. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. Review and 
Evaluation of Australian Information about Primary 
Health Care. Canberra (AUST): AIHW; 2008.
2. Del Fante P, Allan D, Babidge E. Getting the most 
out of your practice. The Practice Health Atlas and 
business modelling opportunities. Aust Fam Physician. 
2006;35(1/2):34-8.
3. Guy RJ, Kong F, Goller J, Franklin N, Bergeri I, Dimech 
W, et al. A new national chlamydia sentinel surveillance 
system in Australia: Evaluation of the first stage of 
implementation. Commun Dis Intell. 2010;34(1):319.
4. Liljeqvist GTH, Staff M, Puech M, Blom H, Torvaldsen 
S. Automated data extraction from general practice 
records in an Australian setting: Trends in influenza-like 
illness in sentinel general practices and emergency 
departments. BMC Public Health. 2011;11(1):435.
5. Noble D, Smith D, Mathur R, Robson J, Greenhalgh 
T. Feasibility study of geospatial mapping of chronic 
disease risk to inform public health commissioning. 
BMJ Open. 2012;2:1-11.
6. Dubowitz T, Williams M, Steiner ED, Weden MM, 
Miyashiro L, Jacobson D, et al. Using geographic 
information systems to match local health needs with 
public health services and programs. Am J Public Health. 
2011;101(9):1664-5.
7. Buck MD, Anane S, Taverna J, Amirfar S, Stubbs-Dame 
R, Singer J. The Hub Population Health System: 
Distributed ad hoc queries and alerts. J Am Med Inform 
Assoc. 2012;19(1e):e46-50.
8. El Emam K, Hu J, Mercer J, Peyton L, Kantarcioglu M, 
Malin B, et al. A secure protocol for protecting the 
identity of providers when disclosing data for disease 
surveillance. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2011;18(3):212-17.
9. Nacul E, Soljak M, Samarasundera E, Hopkinson 
NS, Lacerda E, Indulkar T, et al. COPD in England: A 
comparison of expected, model-based prevalence 
and observed prevalence from general practice data. 
J Public Health. 2010;33(1):108-16.
10. Hampton KH, Fitch MK, Allshouse WB, Doherty IA, 
Gesink DC, Leone PA, et al. Mapping health data: 
Improved privacy protection with donut method 
geomasking. Am J Epidemiol. 2010;172(9):1062-9.
11. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Australian Statistical 
Geography Standard (ASGS) [Internet]. Canberra (AUST): 
ABS; 2011 [cited 2013 Jun 30]. Available from: http://
www.abs.gov.au/
12. Spruill NL. The confidentiality and analytic usefulness 
of masked business micro-data. Proceedings of the 
American Statistical Association Section on Survey 
Research Methods; 1983; vol XVIII .p. 602-7; American 
Statistical Association Alexandria, VA.
13. Sweeney L. k-Annonymity: A model for Protecting 
Privacy. Int J Unc Fuzz Knowl Based Syst. 2002;10(05): 
557-70.
14. Liaw S-T, Boyle D. Secure Data Linkage and Information 
Sharing With GRHANITE. In: Grain H, editor. HIC 2008 
Australia’s Health Informatics Conference. Melbourne 
(AUST): Health Informatics Society of Australia; 2008.
15. Schattner P, Saunders M, Stanger L, Speak M, Russo 
K. Clinical data extraction and feedback in general 
practice: a case study from Australian primary care. 
Inform Prim Care. 2010;18(3):205-12.
16. Mullan N, Boyd J, Konings P, Butler D, Veenendaal 
B, West G, et al. Spatial Data Infrastructures and 
Geocoding of Health Data in Australia. In: ESRI, editor. 
International Geospatial Geocoding Conference; 2011. 
Redlands, CA; 2011.
17. Jones SD, Eagleson S, Escobar FJ, Hunter GJ. Lost in the 
Mail: The inherent errors of mapping Australia post 
postcodes to ABS derived postal areas. Aust Geogr Stud. 
2003;41(2):171–9.
18. El Emam K, Jonker E, Arbuckle L, Malin B. A systematic 
review of re-identification attacks on health data. PLoS 
One. 2011;6(12):e28071.
19. Exeter DJ, Rodgers SE, Sabel CE. “Whose data is it 
anyway?” The implications of putting small area-
level health and social data online. Health Policy. 
2014;114(1):88-96.
20. Rodgers SE, Demmler JC, Dsilva R, Lyons RA. Protecting 
health data privacy while using residence-based 
environment and demographic data. Health Place. 
2012;18(2):209-17.
21. Breen KJ. Consent for the linkage of data for public 
health research: Is it (or should it be) an absolute pre-
requisite? Aust N Z J Public Health. 2001;25(5):423-5.
22. Churches T. A proposed architecture and method of 
operation for improving the protection of privacy 
and confidentiality in disease registers. BMC Med Res 
Methodol. 2003;3:1.
23. Holman CD. The impracticable nature of consent for 
research use of linked administrative health records. 
Aust N Z J Public Health. 2001;25(5):421-2.
24. Holman C, Bass JA, Rosman DL, Smith MB, Semmens 
JB, Glasson EJ, et al. A decade of data linkage in 
Western Australia: Strategic design, applications and 
benefits of the WA data linkage system. Aust Health 
Rev. 2008;32(4):766-77.
25. Lovett R, Fisher J, Al-Yaman F, Dance P, Vally H. A review 
of Australian health privacy regulation regarding the 
use and disclosure of identified data to conduct data 
linkage. Aust N Z J Public Health. 2008;32(3):282-5.
26. Kelman CW, Bass AJ, Holman CDJ. Research use of 
linked health data - a best practice protocol. Aust N Z J 
Public Health. 2002;26(3):251-5.
27. Cadilhac DA, Sundararajan V, Andrew N, Kilkenny MF, 
Flack F, Anderson P, et al. Using linked data to more 
comprehensively measure the quality of care for 
stroke – understanding the issues. Australas Epidemiol. 
2013;20(1):15-9.
28. Microsoft Developer Network. GUID Structure [Internet]. 
Seattle (WA): Microsoft; 2013 [cited 2013 Jun]. Available 
from: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/
aa373931%28VS.85%29.aspx
29. Bagheri N, McRae I, Konings P, Butler D, Douglas K, Fante 
PD, et al. Undiagnosed diabetes from cross-sectional 
GP practice data: an approach to identify communities 
with high likelihood of undiagnosed diabetes. BMJ 
Open. 2014;4(7):e005305.
30. Royal Australian College of General Practitioners. 
Standards for General Practices. 4th ed. Melbourne 
(AUST): RACGP; 2012.
31. Beyer K, Tiwari C, Rushton G. Five Essential Properties 
of Disease Maps. Ann Assoc Am Geogr. 2012;102(5): 
1067-75.
32. Armstrong MP, Rushton G, Zimmerman DL. 
Geographically masking health data to preserve 
confidentiality. Stat Med. 1999;18(5):497–525.
Mazumdar et al. Article
